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Abstract
Compulsive tendencies are a central feature of problematic human behavior and thereby are of great interest to the
scientific and clinical community. However, no consensus exists about the precise meaning of ‘compulsivity,’
creating confusion in the field and hampering comparison across psychiatric disorders. A vague conceptualization
makes compulsivity a moving target encompassing a fluctuating variety of behaviors, which is unlikely to improve
the new dimension-based psychiatric or psychopathology approach. This article aims to help progress the definition
of what constitutes compulsive behavior, cross-diagnostically, by analyzing different definitions in the psychiatric
literature. We searched PubMed for articles in human psychiatric research with ‘compulsive behavior’ or ‘compul-
sivity’ in the title that focused on the broader concept of compulsivity—returning 28 articles with nine original
definitions. Within the definitions, we separated three types of descriptive elements: phenomenological, observational
and explanatory. The elements most applicable, cross-diagnostically, resulted in this definition: Compulsive behavior
consists of repetitive acts that are characterized by the feeling that one ‘has to’ perform them while one is aware that
these acts are not in line with one’s overall goal. Having a more unified definition for compulsive behavior will
make its meaning precise and explicit, and therefore more transferable and testable across clinical and non-clinical
populations.
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Introduction
In many psychiatric or psychopathological disorders, patients
repetitively engage in behaviors that are disruptive for them-
selves and their environment. In obsessive-compulsive disor-
der (OCD), patients often report that they realize the nonsen-
sical nature of their compulsions (e.g., washing hands 20
times) and the disruptive effects the compulsions have on their
life, but cannot always give a reason for why they do them
(Denys, 2011). Addicted patients can often explain why they
started using the substance of abuse or betting on electronic
gaming machines (e.g., pleasure, peer pressure, stress relief).
At a certain stage of the addiction process, however, these
reasons no longer drive the behavior and many patients strug-
gle to understand why they keep using despite an increasing
awareness of the destructive impact of the substance or behav-
ioral addiction (Kennett, Matthews, & Snoek, 2013).
Although the behaviors themselves differ in many aspects
across these disorders, there seems to be a motivational drive
behind them all that defies simple explanations. Patients feel
compelled to act out these behaviors—from now on referred
to as ‘compulsive behavior.’A range of compulsive behaviors
cut across different diagnostic boundaries, including sub-
stance and behavioral addictions, obsessive-compulsive and
related disorders, eating disorders, and neurological disorders
such as Parkinson’s disease (Allen, King, & Hollander, 2003;
Flessner, Knopik, & McGeary, 2012; Grant & Potenza, 2006;
Le Moal & Koob, 2007; Leeman & Potenza, 2012;
Rothemund et al., 2011). Compulsive behaviors are relevant
even beyond psychiatric disorders. In the general population,
about 10% of people have OCD-related sub-threshold symp-
toms that include compulsive behaviors, and some authors
have even suggested that normal repetitive daily behaviors
such as children’s bedtime rituals have compulsive elements
(Denys, 2014; Fineberg et al., 2013).
A question then arises—does the shared phenomenology of
compulsive behaviors across disorders indicate that there are
shared cognitive and neural mechanisms driving them? If
there are, investigating these mechanisms would be important
for many disorders in psychiatry and psychology andmay lead
to new avenues for cross-diagnostic treatments. On the other
hand, the types of behavior that become compulsive differ
greatly between disorders, and investigating them as one
cross-diagnostic construct could lead to generalizations that
may hamper rather than advance our understanding.
Precisely defining compulsive behavior is a fundamental first
step in solving this issue. To investigate compulsive behavior
as a cross-diagnostic construct, we need a clear notion of
which behaviors will be included and excluded. In this paper,
we will first explain and explore this issue in the introduction,
and then conceptualize a clear definition of compulsive behav-
ior by searching the literature and comparing and discussing
different definitions used in the field of behavioral sciences.
Compulsivity as a Cross-Diagnostic Behavioral
Dimension
The idea that compulsivity is an important behavioral dimen-
sion that needs to be investigated across disorders is gaining
popularity, and over the last few years, studies into compul-
sivity have increased in number (Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de
Wit, & Ersche, 2012). A PubMed search shows that the num-
ber of papers with ‘compulsivity’ in the title or summary more
than doubled in the last five years (n = 236 in 2011–2015)
compared with the previous five years (n = 97 in 2006–
2010) and multiplied by four compared with the five years
prior to that (n = 52 in 2001–2005). Moreover, the Strategic
Plan of the U.S. Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) aims to
establish a new classification of psychiatry for research pur-
poses based on dimensions of observable behavior and neu-
robiological measures instead of diagnostic categories
(National Institute of Mental Health Strategic Plan, 2008).
The current interest in such a new classification results from
the discontent with the progress of neurobiological research in
psychiatry and the idea that these behavioral dimensions may
map more closely to findings from neurobiological research.
Compulsive behavior is included as one of these behavioral
dimensions in the NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC), underlining the interest in research community in
investigating compulsive behavior as a cross-diagnostic di-
mension in psychopathology (Cuthbert, 2014).
Several studies suggest that shared cognitive and neural
mechanisms underlie compulsive behaviors across disorders.
A compulsive brain circuitry has been suggested based on
overlapping neural circuits that underlie compulsive behaviors
in different psychiatric disorders (Fontenelle, Oostermeijer,
Harrison, Pantelis, & Yücel, 2011; van den Heuvel et al.,
2016). These circuits are associated with cognitive processes
implicated in the development of compulsive behaviors.
Among the most replicated findings in compulsive disorders
are abnormalities in the frontostriatal circuit (Baxter et al.,
1992; Robinson et al., 1995; van den Heuvel et al., 2010).
Regions in this circuit, such as the orbitofrontal cortex and
ventral striatum, are involved in reinforcement learning,
steering behavior and—especially in the more dorsal region
of the striatum—repetitive performance of learned behavior
(Shohamy, 2011). Disturbances in learning processes (e.g. in-
creased errors or reaction times in a reversal learning task or
differences in sensitivity to learning from positive versus neg-
ative outcomes) and associated fronto-striatal circuits may
contribute to the inflexibility and persistence that characterize
compulsive behaviors (de Ruiter et al., 2009; Remijnse et al.,
2006; Valerius, Lumpp, Kuelz, Freyer, & Voderholzer, 2008).
Functional deviations in regions of cognitive control such as
the inferior frontal gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and presupplementary motor
area have been associated with the inability to overcome and
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regain control over compulsive behaviors despite destructive
consequences. Moreover, preventing negative outcomes such
as anxiety, uncertainty, or stress-like states may be an impor-
tant motivating factor behind compulsive behaviors. A popu-
lar dual processing framework that encapsulates these neural
cognitive abnormalities, suggests compulsive behavior in-
volves an imbalance between hypoactive goal-directed con-
trol and hyperactive habit learning systems, with obsessions
and trait anxiety playing a role as an independent contributor
to compulsive avoidance habit learning (Fineberg et al., 2018;
Gillan, Robbins, Sahakian, van den Heuvel, & van Wingen,
2016). Where either an overreliance on habitual learning (i.e.,
strong stimulus response links) associated with abnormalities
in the putamen or reduced goal-directed control associated
with abnormalities in the caudate and ventromedial PFC result
in the inflexibility and persistence that characterizes compul-
sive behaviors. However, also within this framework it is pos-
sible that different types of compulsive behavior are coupled
to specific disturbances of the goal-directed control and habit
learning systems (e.g., one type of compulsivity might be
more related to goal-directed control deficits whereas another
type to excessive habitual learning).
While the dysfunctional cognitive constructs and neural
regions might be similar across many disorders, the underly-
ing nature of these neural and cognitive processes may be
diametrically different. For instance, although abnormalities
in similar regions have been found in OCD and addiction,
the direction of the deviation with healthy controls can be
entirely opposed. In OCD patients, error- or conflict-related
ACC hyperactivation has been found, while in addictions,
ACC hypoactivation was found during error processing
(Luijten et al., 2014; Melcher, Falkai, & Gruber, 2008).
Although both disorders may have a suboptimal response to
errors—which could lead to aberrant learning and decision-
making underlying compulsive behaviors—the mechanisms
behind this affected function may differ. Moreover, the point
at which compulsive behaviors develop in the disease trajec-
tory can differ between disorders, which may point at different
mechanisms underlying compulsive behavior development.
In addiction, behavior typically becomes more compulsive
in later stages of the disorder, while compulsive behaviors
characterize OCD from early on in the disorder (Coles,
Johnson, & Schubert, 2011; Koob, 2009). In anorexia
nervosa, it is difficult to establish whether behaviors related
to food-restriction or excessive exercise start out as compul-
sive or develop later. At onset, these behaviors are driven both
by the reinforcing effect of accomplishment (weight loss) as
well as by preventing negative outcomes (e.g., negative feel-
ings associated with weight gain). The initial behavior could
be viewed as reward-driven similar to the first stages of ad-
diction or could also be interpreted as a rigid type of avoidance
behavior similar to OCD symptoms (Godier & Park, 2014).
While in trichotillomania it may differ greatly between
patients, in some cases hair pulling may start out as a pleasur-
able activity, while for others it may feel compulsive right
from the start. Therefore, while there are striking similarities
between these compulsive behaviors (e.g., repetitive and de-
structive, overlap in neural circuits), the nature of the compul-
sive behaviors across different disorders can differ significant-
ly regarding the role of positive or negative reinforcement,
level of goal-directedness, developmental trajectory, and di-
rection of neural abnormalities.
Lack of Definition for Compulsivity
This brings us back to our important question of whether the
overlap of compulsive behaviors between disorders is sub-
stantial enough to justify investigating compulsivity as a
cross-diagnostic construct. Difference between disorders in
the developmental trajectories and mechanisms that lead to
compulsive behaviours may be too large to be usefully isolat-
ed and investigated. Perhaps it is more useful to divide and
study compulsive behavior subtypes separately. Themain hur-
dle for investigating this question is that we have no agreed-
upon definition of the concept of compulsivity, as reflected in
the wide variety of definitions in Table 1 (Denys, 2014; Yücel
& Fontenelle, 2012). This lack of consensus creates confusion
and raises the possibility that the term ‘compulsivity’ refers to
different constructs within and across psychiatric disorders.
This confusion is also reflected in the lack of agreed-upon
measurement of compulsivity such as a questionnaire or a
neuropsychological test beyond those intertwined with certain
psychiatric diagnoses (e.g., Yale–Brown Obsessive
Compulsive Scale; Goodman et al., 1989).
Moreover, the frontostriatal circuitry is implicated in many
cognitive processes including decision-making, motivation,
salience and cognitive control, and is also disturbed in psychi-
atric disorders not typically associated with compulsive be-
havior, such as schizophrenia. Therefore, the observation that
all compulsive disorders share abnormalities in the
frontostriatal circuitry is not necessarily indicative of a shared
neural mechanism specific to compulsivity. Without a defini-
tion, we cannot expect much progress from compulsivity re-
search within psychiatry’s new dimension-based approach. A
vague conceptualization will make compulsivity a moving
target encompassing a fluctuating variety of behaviors, which
is unlikely to improve the biological footing of psychiatry or
psychopathology research.
The word ‘compulsive’ has been used for years both infor-
mally and in clinical practice. Its use shapes its meaning. In
this review, we aim to comprehensively document how this
term has been used in the behavioral sciences field and syn-
thesize this into a common understanding of compulsivity that
we can use to classify behavior in a coherent way and distin-
guish it from other types of pathological behaviors. We aim to
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conceptualize compulsive behavior in a broad manner that is
inclusive of its use in different disorders.
Methods
Literature Search
We searched PubMed for relevant articles by using the key
words ‘compulsive behavior’ or ‘compulsivity.’ Papers hav-
ing the above key words on their title were searched for def-
initions of compulsivity or compulsive behavior. In order to
avoid definitions of compulsivity found in articles that were
merely intended for a specific disorder or situation, we exclud-
ed papers that investigated one or two specific disorders.
Therefore, the resulting articles are all focused on compulsiv-
ity in a broader sense. It is useful to note that these articles
were not intended to provide a comprehensive definition of
compulsivity, although they give a good idea of how compul-
sivity is used in the literature. We also excluded articles focus-
ing only on animal research.
This search and selection strategy resulted in 28 articles: 15
included a definition of compulsivity or compulsive behavior,
10 gave no definition of compulsivity or compulsive behavior
and three discussed or described compulsivity without specif-
ically defining it (Robbins, Curran, & de Wit, 2012; van den
Heuvel et al., 2010; Yücel & Fontenelle, 2012). Of the 15
papers that included a definition of compulsivity or compul-
sive behavior, six used a previous definition reported in an-
other article from the list, leaving nine original definitions (see
Table 1). Although some of the definitions overlap and are
sometimes used by the same research groups, we will discuss
them separately.
Elements of Compulsivity in Definitions
We listed the original definitions and divided them into three
description types: phenomenological, observational and ex-
planatory. Respectively, these describe the actor’s experience
during the behavior, how the behavior can be identified from a
third-person perspective, and what motivation drives the be-
havior. We used these description types to dissect the concepts
found in the literature.
Results
Phenomenological Elements
Five papers include phenomenological descriptions in their
definition, leading to four phenomenological elements: (A)
inability not to perform an act, (B) experienced loss of control,
(C) feeling one ‘has to’ perform an act, (D) unpleasantness of
repetitive actions (see Table 1). Elements A, B and C are well
described in an article by Denys (2014). The author looked at
different behaviors associated with compulsivity to find the
essence of compulsivity and stripped them of elements not
present in all forms of compulsivity. What is left—common
to all manifestations across psychiatric disorders—is the ex-
perience that one has to or feels (internally) forced to perform
an act. Or in other words, one feels unable not to perform the
act (Denys, 2014). This leads to the experience of loss of
control. Figee et al. (2013) describe the feeling of having to
act physically as an irresistible urge to actwith loss of control
over this urge, and additionally as the experienced inability (or
diminished ability) not to act. This is in accordance with the
phenomenological element of Torregrossa et al. (2008) that a
person feels compelled to perform a behavior. Another paper
uses only element B to define compulsive behavior, namely, a
loss of control over goal-directed behavior (Gillan et al.,
2016). And the last paper describes compulsive actions as
unpleasant (D: Fineberg et al., 2010).
Observational Elements
Seven papers include descriptive aspects of compulsive be-
havior, resulting in four observational elements: (A) behavior
is repetitive, (B) it is nonadaptive or inappropriate for the
context, (C) it leads to functional impairment, (D) it is per-
formed in a habitual or stereotyped manner. Four of these
papers describe compulsive behavior as ongoing (i.e., repeti-
tive or persisting) despite negative consequences (e.g., leading
to functional impairment: Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011;
Fineberg et al., 2014, 2010; Grant et al., 2016), while three
alternatively or additionally state that compulsive behaviors
lack a clear function (i.e., inappropriate for context or without
adaptive function or no obvious relationship to overall goal,
aspect B: Berlin & Hollander, 2014; Dalley et al., 2011;
Fineberg et al., 2014). One paper (Torregrossa et al., 2008)
does not specify that the behavior is ongoing but does include
that the behavior is performed even if inappropriate (B) or
counterproductive (C). Two of the papers describe that com-
pulsive behavior is performed in a habitual or stereotyped
fashion (D: Figee et al., 2013; Fineberg et al., 2014).
Explanatory Elements
Three papers provide three different elements that give ex-
planatory descriptions of compulsive action: (A) to prevent
negative consequences, (B) according to rigid rules, (C) to
reduce anxiety or stress. Two definitions state that the be-
havior is performed to prevent perceived negative conse-
quences, one of which provides an alternative possibility,
namely, to prevent perceived negative consequences or ac-
cording to rigid rules (Fineberg et al., 2014, 2010). Finally,
8 Neuropsychol Rev (2019) 29:4–13
Torregrossa et al. (2008) state that the behavior is per-
formed to relieve anxiety or stress.
Discussion
In accordance with Denys (2014), we consider the feeling that
one has to perform an action, or the inability to stop
performing an action, as the most essential characteristic of
compulsive behavior present in all forms of compulsivity.
This core aspect is necessary to label a behavior compulsive
and is associated with lack of control over that specific behav-
ior. The feeling that one has to perform an action or is not
capable of stopping an action indicates that that behavior, at
least partially, diverges from volitional control. For instance,
we say that addiction turns compulsive with the experience
that the behavior is less steered by one’s will and more by an
uncontrollable internal force (Koob, 2017; Solomon, 1980;
Solomon & Corbit, 1974). The label compulsive therefore
implies an internal struggle, that is, one feels as if one has to
perform a behavior irrespective of one’s will. Three phenom-
enological elements point at this: (A) the inability not to per-
form an act, (B) experienced loss of control, (C) feeling one
has to perform an act.
Augmenting the phenomenological description, the obser-
vational elements describe how the behavior appears from an
outside perspective. The description that one feels one has to
perform the behavior may be necessary to establish whether
the behavior is compulsive but may lack in specificity and
thus not be sufficient. For instance, a behavior only performed
once may be felt as if one has to perform it, yet we would not
call a once-off act compulsive. Additional observational ele-
ments may clarify what the behaviors we usually label as
compulsive have in common besides the phenomenological
experience.
Two observational elements, (1) repetitive behavior and (2)
resulting in negative consequences, were used by most of the
papers and respective definitions in Table 1 (in six and five of
nine definitions, respectively), often in combination (four of
nine definitions). Element 2 is augmented or alternated in four
definitions with the element that behavior is inappropriate for
its context. That the behavior is inappropriate or results in
negative consequences emphasizes the dysfunctional nature
of compulsive behavior and implies that the behavior, from
an outsider’s perspective, is not in line with the actor’s overall
goals or at least conflicts with certain goals. This also de-
scribes the divergence between behavior and volition, but
from an outsider’s perspective, namely, acting in a way that
leads to negative consequences or results in no obvious valu-
able outcome. Additionally, the repetitive nature is the most
frequently used element in the definitions, indicating its im-
portance. Much of the compulsivity is in the persisting nature
of the behavior.
Finally, the last observational element included in three of
eight definitions is that the behavior is performed in a habitual
or stereotyped fashion. This element may be included to em-
phasize that the behavior is repeated in a specific (or fixed)
way. Compulsive behaviors in OCD, skin picking, or tricho-
tillomania often have a fixed pattern. However, compulsive
behaviors in eating disorders, hoarding disorder and addic-
tions often vary andmay not always be performed in a specific
pattern. Therefore, this element seems less useful in a
transdiagnostic conceptualization of compulsive behavior.
Three definitions (Berlin & Hollander, 2014; Dalley et al.,
2011; Grant et al., 2016) include exclusively observational
elements, which could be an advantage for translational re-
search because no information is needed on phenomenologi-
cal or motivational (explanatory) aspects. However, if the def-
inition exclusively consists of observational elements, it im-
plies that behavior could be labeled compulsive without the
person experiencing it as such. For instance, if a person loses
their job due to drug use, would we qualify it as compulsive
even if they feel they could stop whenever they want but
willingly took the risk of losing their job? If a person spends
two hours a day turning a light switch on and off, would this
be qualified as compulsive even if they enjoy the behavior and
feel they could stop any time? In these examples the behaviors
are repetitive and result in negative consequences or are inap-
propriate for the context. Therefore, based on exclusively ob-
servational criteria the two examples above would qualify as
compulsive. However, we would argue that the label compul-
sive should be restricted to those instances where one feels
forced or driven to act against one’s volition. If behavior and
volition completely concur, one wouldwant to perform the act
and not experience having to perform the act. Moreover, the
phenomenological element also distinguishes compulsive be-
havior from stereotyped behavior and habits, both of which
can be repetitive and inappropriate, and lead to negative con-
sequences. Therefore, observational elements alone do not
suffice to capture the essence of human compulsive behavior.
Three definitions provide explanatory elements (describing
the motivation behind the act). Two explanatory elements are:
(1) to prevent or avoid perceived negative consequences or
suffering (2) to reduce anxiety or stress. Negative conse-
quences can be interpreted very widely and could include a
specific event that is prevented (i.e., OCD patient washes
hands to prevent contamination with disease), a feeling or
state that is prevented (i.e., withdrawal symptoms or difficult
emotions in addiction) or a vague ominous idea that ‘some-
thing bad’ may happen if the behavior is not performed.
Element 2 is more specific and states that the behavior is
aimed at reducing stress or anxiety, suggesting that it is a
means of avoiding these already-present feelings or state.
Whether decreasing anxiety or stress always directly moti-
vates compulsive behavior is unknown. Even in OCD where
anxiety commonly occurs, reported anxiety is variable
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between patients—and when it is present, it is hard to establish
whether compulsions are driven by anxiety or may actually
result in anxiety. This issue can be avoided by stating that
behavior is aimed at reducing or preventing a negative
outcome which includes both of the explanatory elements.
Here a negative outcome can also include states or feelings
such as stress or discomfort. This rephrasing of the first two
explanatory elements is in line with the DSM diagnosis of
OCD where these elements likely derive from. In OCD com-
pulsions are aimed at preventing or reducing distress, or
preventing some dreaded event or situation. Also, in anorexia
nervosa compulsions are aimed at decreasing weight or
preventing weight gain. Although it has been suggested that,
over time, anorexia nervosa behaviors become inherently re-
warding without weight loss, the idea of gaining weight still
causes considerable distress to patients in the later stages of
the disease (Godier & Park, 2014). Moreover, as previously
mentioned, addiction is thought to enter a compulsive phase
when it is driven more by alleviating a negative emotional
state than pursuing a pleasurable state (Koob, 2009).
We think it is an interesting hypothesis that compulsive
behavior is aimed at reducing or preventing a negative out-
come and believe it may play an important role in much of the
compulsive behavior across disorders. However, it is debat-
able whether every form of compulsive behavior is aimed at
reducing or preventing a negative outcome. The above men-
tioned dual processing theory, views compulsive behavior as
the result of excessive habit-formation and therefore mostly
driven by reinforced stimulus–response contingencies (Gillan
et al., 2016). Over time, patients may experience their behav-
ior as more automatic and may not always be aware that anx-
iety or stress or the prospect of a negative event is driving the
behavior. In the same line of reasoning compulsive behavior
might not always be performed according to rigid rules, which
is the third explanatory element. Therefore, we do not recom-
mend including these explanatory elements in the definition at
this time. However, we encourage future studies to investigate
the extent to which compulsive behavior is generally driven
by the aim to reduce or prevent a negative outcome.
On a side note, we would like to mention that the preven-
tion of a negative outcome and habitual tendencies are not
necessarily mutually exclusive explanations of compulsive
behaviors. The combination of these two factors could very
well give compulsive behaviors much of their inflexibility and
persistence. The prevention or reduction of a negative out-
come can become habitual over time––a habit of avoidance.
While the person may be largely successful at keeping stress
and anxiety at bay using compulsive acts, there is still an
affective undertone driving these acts (Sjoerds, Luigjes, van
den Brink, Denys, & Yücel, 2014). This can become apparent
if the person is stopped from performing the act and stress
levels rise. This seems to be how an OCD compulsion de-
velops, often beginning as an aim to reduce or prevent a
negative outcome but becoming more habitual and seemingly
less affect-driven over time. The affective undertone is often
exposed in response prevention therapy where OCD patients
must resist the urge to perform the compulsive act. Many
patients experience increased anxiety even if they were not
aware of anxiety driving the compulsive behavior. In addic-
tion, behavior is labeled compulsive when it shifts from being
driven by rewarding properties to being driven by negative
prospects (e.g., feelings of shame or withdrawal symptoms)
or alleviating negative feelings (Koob, 2009). Also in addic-
tion, the prevention or reduction of a negative outcome may
turn habitual with repetition, however, at a later stage of the
disorder.
Definition of Compulsive Behavior
The phenomenological description that one feels as if one has
to perform the behavior and the observational description that
the behavior is repetitive and not in line with one’s overall
goal both indicate that the behavior diverges from one’s will.
When behavior diverges from one’s will, a feeling of control
over the behavior is lost. However, to simply state that com-
pulsive behavior is unwanted is problematic because at the
moment of performing an action, one may feel as if one wants
to perform the behavior (e.g., to reduce anxiety, relieve the
urge) while also being aware that on another level (e.g., the
results of the behavior) it is not what one wants. This is dif-
ferent from impulsive behavior where behavior and will can
fully concur at the moment of action although one may later
regret this action (e.g., buying a sports car that one cannot
afford). Thus, in compulsive behavior, there is awareness at
the time of performing an action that the behavior to some
extent is unwanted. This goes together with the ongoing and
dynamic internal struggle of compulsive behavior.
We suggest the following definition: compulsive behavior
consists of repetitive acts that are characterized by the feeling
that one has to perform themwhile one is aware that these acts
are not in line with one’s overall goal. As mentioned at the
beginning of the discussion, we view the feeling that one has
to perform the act as the essence of compulsive behavior. In
addition, to specify compulsive behavior further and distin-
guish it from behaviors with this same experience, we find it
important to include that the behavior is persisting (repetitive)
and is dysfunctional or unwanted. This is in line with the
definitions in Table 1 that include inappropriateness or
resulting in negative consequences (observational elements
B and C in Table 1). However, since direct negative conse-
quences are not always clear with all types of compulsive
behavior (e.g., OCD compulsions may not result in harmful
consequences outside time spent on them), and what is appro-
priate can be interpreted differently among people or cultures,
we chose to formulate this dysfunctional nature as ‘not in line
with one’s overall goal.’ This emphasizes that the behavior is
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unwanted in a broader perspective (i.e., it conflicts with one’s
overall concerns, such as building a career or spending time
with family) while keeping the possibility open that at the
moment of the compulsive act, one may feel as if one wants
to perform it (e.g., to relieve stress). We suggest adding to the
definition of compulsivity that one is aware that these acts are
not in line with one’s overall goals. This will help distinguish
it from behavior that is performed in an impulsive or habitual
manner, or behavior that others find dysfunctional while the
person does not experience a conflict with their goals. The
experience that someone feels internally forced to act out the
behavior implies a level of resistance, knowing that to some
extent one does not want to perform the act.
Therefore, behavior that aligns with the person’s goals,
causing no resistance, conflict or experience of being forced
to act, will not be called compulsive no matter how dysfunc-
tional. We realize that in clinical practice, the experience of
one’s behavior is rarely consistent. Sometimes patients expe-
rience the behavior in accordance with their goals while at
other times they try to resist the behavior. When assessing
behavior in clinical practice, we suggest that in the case of
repetitive behavior, a general feeling that one has to perform
the behavior, together with overall recognition that the behav-
ior is not in line with one’s goal, is sufficient to qualify as
compulsive even if the strength of these experiences fluctuates
over time.
In research applications the three criteria: (1) feels as if one
has to perform the behavior (2) is repetitive (3) one is aware
that it is not in line with one’s goal, can be used to
operationalize compulsive behavior. We realize that the
operationalization of these criteria to an experimental design
is not clear-cut. For instance, the incorporation of the phenom-
enological criterion (1) may require a questionnaire in human
research and may not be translatable to animal models.
However, there are inevitably limitations in the extent to
which experimental operationalization (and especially animal
models) captures clinical phenomena. In this aspect compul-
sive behavior is not different from other psychiatric phenom-
ena such as depression or hallucinations. A clear definition
can help to explicitly point out these differences in order to
interpret the findings and translate it back to real world impli-
cations. For instance, one operationalization of compulsive
behavior in animal models involves ongoing habitual (non-
goal directed) behavior despite negative consequences (such
as a foot shock) (Hopf & Lesscher, 2014). This
operationalization could be viewed as a translational interpre-
tation of the criteria (2) repetitive behavior, and (3) that is not
in line with one’s overall goal. Since this model does not test
whether the behavior is accompanied by a feeling that one has
to perform it, it is possible that the resulting animal behavior is
accompanied by different motivations or feelings than com-
pulsive behavior of patients. The awareness of this limitation
will prevent an overinterpretation of the results while the mod-
el is still useful to test certain aspects of compulsive behavior.
Having a single definition for compulsive behavior will
make its meaning more precise and explicit, and therefore
more transferable and testable across clinical and non-
clinical populations. The purpose of a definition is to specify
what to include and exclude under a label. This definition
excludes certain types of behaviors like bedtime rituals for
young children or stereotyped behavior that does not directly
conflict with the person’s goals. Although certain aspects may
be shared with the compulsive behaviors under our definition,
the inclusion of these behaviors would dilute the concept of
compulsive behaviors while other more appropriate labels are
available (i.e., ‘stereotypy’ and ‘ritualistic’). However, the cur-
rent definition still includes a wide variety of behaviors in
psychiatry and psychology, behaviours as different as
counting calories on food packages, repeatedly washing hands
and drinking alcohol. Whether these behaviors share funda-
mental mechanisms that validate studying compulsive behav-
ior as a cross-diagnostic dimension requires further
investigation.
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